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Miller and Crosby: Our Legal Chameleon, The Florida Homestead Exemption Part IV

OUR LEGAL CHAMELEON, THE FLORIDA
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION: IV
HARoLD B. CROSBY AND GEORGE JOHN MILLER
Part IV-

1.

HOMESTEAD PROCEDURAL LAw*

Jurisdictionof Homestead Claims

The mainsail of Florida homestead procedure has traditionally been
the state circuit court, but its wind is not infrequently spilled by the
county judge's court. The Florida Constitution 3 37 invests the circuit
court with "exclusive original jurisdiction" not only of "all cases in
equity" but also "of the action of ejectment and of all actions involving
the titles or boundaries of real estate. .. ." By statute the circuit court
is granted "equity jurisdiction" to determine whether any property, real
or personal, is exempt when claimed to be so; to subject non-exempt
property to satisfaction of judgment; to enjoin the sale of exempt prop-

erty; and to order and decree that such property be set apart and shielded
33
from forced sale.

8

Leaving the circuit court for the moment, it is beyond question that
in matters of homestead the Supreme Court of Florida has final appellate
jurisdiction, and that our usual rule of only one appeal does not apply to
probate proceedings. 33 9 A federal court, however, may deal with the
*The material in Part IV continues the discussion of the law of Florida homestead
exemptions analyzed initially in 2 U. or FLA. L. Rav. 12-83 (1949). Part I analyzes
the steps required for ascertaining the existence of the exemption of homestead realty
from forced sale; Part H covers the inurement of this exemption and its influence on
the transfer of homestead realty; Part III explains the difference between the realty
and personalty exemptions from the standpoint of both forced sale and transfer; Part
IV takes up the procedural aspects of securing exemption, including the troublesome
problem of jurisdiction; and Part V, which will follow in the next issue, deals with the
tax exemption, or, properly speaking, the realty and personalty exclusions from taxation. The complete text of Article X of the Constitution of the State of Florida, on
which the realty and personalty homestead exemptions and the residence exclusion
from taxation are based, is quoted in 2 U. or FrA. L. REv. 83-84 (1949). The personalty tax exclusion, limited to household goods and personal effects, is set forth in FLA.
CoNsT. Art. IX, §11.
'Art. V, §11.
SSORA. STAT. §§222.10, 222.09, 222.08 (1941).
8
IFr. CoNsT. Art. V, §§S, 11.
[ 219 ]
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Florida homestead exemptions whenever it has jurisdiction for some independent reason. 3 40 It quite properly purports to follow the Florida law
3
in each instance, 3 4 1 of course, even when it unwittingly fails to do so. 42
Descending to the bottom of the judicial ladder, the justice of the
peace court 3 4 3 lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate a lien on homestead realty.

This was definitely decided in Haimovitz v. Hector,3 4 4 but the reasoning
in Mr. Justice Whitfield's opinion indicates a basis broader than merely
that of real estate as the object-matter of the litigation; he stresses the
equity jurisdiction involved rather than the problem of determining title
to realty, and emphasizes in particular the existence of adequate remedies
in the circuit court. Indeed, the language is comprehensive enough to
include homestead personalty as well.
This leads to one of the most vexing jurisdictional problems in Florida,
namely, the overlap between the circuit court and the county judge's court
whenever the probate of a will or the administration of an estate in intestacy embraces homestead property, either real or personal. Probate of
wills and administration of the estates of decedents and minors are entrusted to the county judge's court, 3 4 5 subject to the supervision and
... E.g., In re Marschall, 296 Fed. 685 (C. C. A. 5th 1924) ; In re Porter, 3 F. Supp.
582 (S. D. Fla. 1933) ; In re David, 54 F.2d 140 (S. D. Fla. 1931) (bankruptcy); Croker
v. Croker, 51 F.2d 11 (C. C. A. 5th 1931) (bill in equity to set aside devise of realty
allegedly homestead) ; Lamb v. Ralston Purina Co., 155 Fla. 638, 21 So.2d 127 (1945)
(agricultural composition proceedings).
... lbid. The relationship between federal and state law was succinctly summarized
by Brandeis, J., in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78 (1938):
"Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether the
law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest
court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general
common law."

Cf. Kaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487, 496-497 (1941) ; see
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 680 (1930).

"'Croker v. Croker, 7 F.2d 218 (S. D. Fla. 1925); cf. the discussion of contiguity
in 2 U. or FLA. L. REV. 51 (1949).
"'FLA. CONST. Art. V, §22; see FLA. STAT. §§37.01, 37.02 (1941) as to civil jurisdiction.

'.79 Fla. 28, 83 So. 666 (1920). The judgment upon which execution was issued,
and later enjoined, involved less than $100 and had been recorded in the office of the
clerk of the circuit court; cf. FLA. STAT. §81.21 (1941).

""FLA.

CONST. Art. V, §17; FLA. STAT. §§732.01-732.03, 732.41 (Cum. Supp. 1947);

cf. Wells v. Menn, 154 Fla. 173, 177, 17 So.2d 217, 218 (1944). The term "probate" is
broadly defined in FLA. STAT. §731.03(14) (Cum. Supp. 1947) to embrace both testate
and intestate estates.
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appellate jurisdiction of the circuit court and the right of final appeal to
the Supreme Court. 3 4 6 Furthermore, courts of equity "have concurrent
jurisdiction with the county judges in the construction of wills or of any
parts thereof, but the court first obtaining jurisdiction for construction
3 47
shall retain the same."
Neither the county judge's court nor the county court is one of general jurisdiction in the course of the common law; 3 4 s but in matters of
probate the county judge's court has been said in a loose sense to exercise
general jurisdiction within this circumscribed and defined field of activity,
in that its jurisdiction therein is complete. 3 49 Authority to perform
these duties obtains regardless of the fact that construction of the will in
question necessarily determines disputed title to realty definitely embraced
in the estate33 0 or to personalty of a value not cognizable in the county
judge's court in an action at law.3 51
'.FLA. CONST. Art. V, §§11, 5; FLA. STAT. §§732.15-732.20 (Cum. Supp. 1947); cf.
Pitts v. Pitts, 120 Fla. 363, 369, 162 So. 708, 711 (1935), as to other methods of attack

on orders of the county judge. Each county must have a county judge, whose court
is known as the "county judge's court," and may when the Legislature so decides have
a "county court," the judge of which is the individual serving as county judge; but

original jurisdiction in probate and administration always remains in the county judge's
court and is never assigned to the county court, FsA. CoNsT. Art. V, §§16, 18, 17. As
regards jurisdiction generally see FLA. STAT. §34.01 (1941) (county court), §§36.01,
36.02 (1941) (county judge's court), and an excellent recent general description of the
work of the county judge by Brooker, Let the County Judge Do It, 23 FLA. L. J.
5 (1949). Broad problems of jurisdiction, such as the overall supervisory judicial
power inherent in the Supreme Court, and the constant interplay in general among
circuit courts, civil courts of record, county courts, and county judge's courts, are
beyond the scope of this article.
" FrA. STAT. §732.42 (Cum. Supp. 1947). Ullendorff v. Brown, 156 Fla. 655, 24
So.2d 37 (1945), holds emphatically that jurisdiction properly established in probate
in the county judge's court cannot be ousted by the circuit court.
24
E.g., Krivitsky v. Nye, 155 Fla. 45, 54, 19 So.2d 563, 568 (1944) ; see State ex rer.
West's Drug Stores, Inc. v. Cornelius, 110 Fla. 299, 149 So. 332 (1933). A justice of
the peace also lacks general jurisdiction, Porter v. State, 62 Fla. 79, 56 So. 406 (1911).
"'Contrast In re Monks' Estate, 155 Fla. 240, 19 So. 2d 796 (1944), with Mott v.
First Nat. Bank of St. Petersburg, 98 Fla. 444, 124 So. 36 (1929) ; cf. In re Niernsee's
Estate, 147 Fla. 388, 2 So.2d 737 (1941). But note the limitations explained in Wallace
v. Luxmore, 156 Fla. 725, 24 So.2d 302 (1946).
.. Blanton v. State ex rel. McManus, 158 Fla. 667, 29 So.2d 865 (1947), upholding
jurisdiction of county judge's court to decide whether the widow took fee simple, or
life estate with power of disposition during her life only, and therefore whether beneficiaries named in her will or those in will of her husband took title to the realty upon
her death.

"State ex rel. Florida Bank & Trust Co. v. White, 155 Fla. 591, 21 So.2d 213
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Personalty. As has been noted in Part II, 1 supra,35 2 homestead realty
cannot be devised by a male homesteader leaving either a widow or lineal
descendants, or by a female homesteader survived by lineal descendants.
Intestacy is, so to speak, compelled; and such succession is today limited
to three particular patterns, namely, descent of the entire estate to the
widow in the absence of lineal descendants, or passage of a life estate to
the widow, with vested remainders per stirpes to the lineal descendants,
or outright vesting of the entire estate in the lineal descendants in the
absence of a widow. 3 5 3 This may perhaps account for the strictures
35 4
placed by our Supreme Court on alienation inter vivos.

No such limitations exist in the case of personalty; and accordingly a
decision as to its homestead or non-homestead character does not alone
fix the recipients. Whether the widow or an heir figures among the
successors has a definite bearing on how much is free to pass; the exemption accompanies this property, up to a maximum value of $1,000, if, and
only if, the personalty in question goes to the widow, an heir, or both.
Assuming that the deceased does bequeath it to them or dies intestate,
and yet assuming that he in fact has unsecured debts exceeding a figure
obtained by subtracting $1,000 from the value of all of his unencumbered
personal property, the determination that $1,000 thereof is or is not homestead necessarily allocates it either to them, by virtue of the influence of
the accompanying exemption as a shield against forced sale, or to his
creditors. 35 5 The homestead personalty exemption does not, however,
compel the property to pass to any particular person. One might hazard
a guess that the confusion in thinking that crops out from time to time
in visualizing the homestead personalty exemption has as its seed this
type of situation.
(1944).

FLA. CONST. Art. V, §17, confers upon the county judge's court "original

jurisdiction in all cases at law in which the demand or value or [si] property involved
shall not exceed one hundred dollars"; §18 increases this limit to $500 in the county
court.
"22 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 53 (1949).
53
FLA. STAT. §§731.05, 731.25, 731.27 (Cum. Supp. 1947) ; cf. 2 U. oF FLA. L. Rzv.
53-61 (1949). An attempted devise of all property of the testator is nugatory as to
the homestead realty under these circumstances; all personalty passes under the will
as a part of the estate, but the homestead realty does not; ci. Efstathion v. Saucer, 158
Fla. 422, 29 So.2d 304 (1947).
S.Cf. Part II, 3 supra, 2 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 67 (1949).
. 5 Seashole v. O'Shields, 139 Fla. 839, 191 So. 74 (1939), rehearing denied, 139 Fla.
844, 191 So. 76 (1939); cf. Part nI supra, 2 U. OF FLA. L. RIv. 77 (1949). Descent in
such instances is governed either by the will or, in intestacy, by FLA. STAT. §731.23

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol2/iss2/2
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The fact is, then, that although passage of personal property and
inurement of the exemption are separate and distinct concepts s 5 6 they
are nevertheless firmly bound together for purposes of analysis. Unlike
problems involving realty, the questions applying to distribution of personalty arise in the following order:
1. To whom would this property pass without regard to unsecured
creditors, 3 5 7 that is, what does the will provide or what do
the laws of intestate succession prescribe by way of fixing the
successors to free assets?
2. Does the group selected in answer to the first question include
the widow, an heir, or both, among those entitled?
3. Does personal property that passes to any of them meet the
other requirements for homestead exemption? 3 5 8
4. If so, what is left out of the remainder, after satisfying the
claims of creditors, for further distribution?
If the answer to the third question be in the negative, the fourth question becomes merely: What are the normal rules governing distribution
of an estate? It is also apparent that the first question posed above is
implicit in any consideration of the second; and that, if the answer to
the second be negative, the third question cannot possibly arise, inasmuch
as the exemption does not accompany any personalty of the homesteader
after his death unless such property passes to the widow or an heir.
In the light of the foregoing discussion the opinion in Carter'sAdmiz(Cum. Supp. 1947), limited as explained in note 356 infra.
"'Hinson v. Booth, 39 Fla. 333, 22 So. 687 (1897). The laws governing descent,
speaking in a broad sense, embrace dower, which must always be taken into consideration; cf. FLA. STAT. §731.34 (Cum. Supp. 1947). The one-third part allotted to the
widow, in fee simple as to realty and absolutely as to personalty, which part she may
take in lieu of her share in the estate under the will or in intestacy, does not apply to
homestead realty, which descends under separate and distinct statutory provisions.
See in general the helpful opinions by Harrison and Kanner, Assoc. 3j., in Efstathion
v. Saucer, 158 Fla. 422, 29 So.2d 304 (1947), and In re McMillan's Estate, 158 Fla.
898, 30 So.2d 534 (1947), respectively. The provisions of FLA. STAT. §731.36 (Cum.
Supp. 1947), relating to wearing apparel and some of the household goods, and of
§733.20(1) (d) (Cum. Supp. 1947), covering family allowance, should be noted also.
See in general Legis., 2 U. op FLA. L. REv. 118 (1949).
'"The excepted obligations, the time factor in determining precedence as between
a lien and the homestead exemption caimed, and the paramount rank of statutory
liens are discussed, respectively, in 2 U. or FLA. L. Rav. 18, 35, and 36, 79 (1949).
"'lThe tests for qualification are explained in Part I supra, 2 U. or FLA. L. REv.
17 (1949), except that as regards personalty the homesteader need not own realty
provided his domicile is here, and the extent is set in dollars rather than acres; cf.
Part MI supra, 2 U. op FLA. L. REv. 77 (1949).
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istrators v. Carter,3 5 9 still a leading case on this point, takes on an added
importance. particularly this statement: 3 60
"It has heretofore been held that property which is exempt from
seizure for the payment of debts is also exempt from liability and is
not assets in the hands of an administrator subject to administration.
Baker vs. State, 17 Fla., 406; Wilson Ex. vs. Fridenburg, 19 Fla.,
461."
The first point to note is that the Baker and Wilson cases cited as
authority decided nothing whatever concerning homestead personalty.
In the Baker case the crop of oranges was specifically and properly regarded as realty; 36 1 in the Wilson case the dispute involved the family
residence alone.
The second point to note is that the Carter case centered on the conflicting claims of creditors and heirs in intestacy. That the exemption of
the homesteader accompanied $1,000 of his personalty when it passed to
his heirs, as against his creditors, was the precise issue decided; and any
statement going beyond this is dictum only.
Statements or implications indicating in a broad sense full and complete jurisdiction in the circuit court over "homestead" or "homestead
exemptions" are uniformly found in cases involving either realty3

62

or

the assertion by creditors of the right to levy on the personalty of the
homesteader during his life.3

necessarily being exclusive.

63

36 4

Even so, jurisdiction can be full without

Furthermore, the statutory provisions

Fla. 558 (1884).
'"Id.at 561.
... Baker v. State, 17 Fla. 406, 407, 409 (1879); accord, Adams v. Adams, 158 Fla.
173, 28 So.2d 254 (1946). The Baker case was correctly interpreted in Barco v. Fennell, 24 Fla. 378, 5 So. 9 (1888).
s.E.g., Hillsborough Inv. Co. v. Wilcox, 152 Fla. 889, 13 So.2d 448 (1943); Spitzer
...20

v. Branning, 135 Fla. 49, 184 So. 770 (1938); Brickell v. Palbicke, 123 Fla. 508, 167

So. 44 (1936); Haimovitz v. Hector, 79 Fla. 28, 83 So. 666 (1920). Other opinions
stating that the homestead is not an asset in the hands of the administrator, yet
demonstrating by their facts that realty alone was under consideration, are: Finlayson
v. Love, 44 Fla. 551, 33 So. 306 (1902); Walker v. Redding, 40 Fla. 124, 23 So. 565
(1898); Hedick v. Hedick, 38 Fla. 252, 21 So. 101 (1896); see Godwin v. King, 31 Fla.
525, 539, 13 So. 108, 111 (1893).

... E.g., Tracy v. Lucik, 138 Fla. 188, 189 So. 430 (1939) ; Bennett v. Bogue, 88 Fla.
109, 101 So. 206 (1924) ; McMichael v. Grady, 34 Fla. 219, 15 So. 765 (1894).
"'See notes 368, 370, 372 infra; cf. United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175, 187
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relating to exempt estates authorize not only distribution of homestead
property, real as well as personal, by the county judge, but also permit
him to determine whether such property is in fact homestead. 3 6 5 Again,
the Small Estates Act 3 6 6 empowers him to "dispense with administration
upon the estate of any testate or intestate" whenever "the entire estate is
exempt from the claims of creditors under the constitution and statutes"
36 7
of Florida.
Parenthetically, from the standpoint of forced sale, it is perhaps
advisable to note at this point that replevin of homestead personalty
wrongfully seized under a writ of attachment was allowed in Allan v.
IngraM,3 6 8 in which the Supreme Court specifically held that the remedy
in equity 3 6 9 is not exclusive. A comparatively recent action by a tenant

in the county court to replevy his homestead furniture from a landlord
370
failed to elicit any jurisdictional doubts.

From a constitutional standpoint it cannot be disputed that the original
equity jurisdiction of the circuit court is exclusive. 3 7 ' But this does not
(1936).
3 F." STAT. §734.08 (Cum. Supp. 1947). But cf. FLA. STAT. §734.08 (1941).
As
originally worded this section read as follows:
"If at any time during the course of administration it shall be made to appear
to the county judge by petition, and in the event the allegations of said petition
shall be denied, then by trial of the issues made, that the estate does not consist
of more than the homestead and exempt personal property of the decedent, the
county judge may thereupon direct and order the distribution of said estate
among the persons entitled to receive the same and upon said distribution may
thereupon enter his order relieving, releasing and discharging the personal representative."
In 1945 the same subsection was reworded by c. 22783, §4, FLA. STAT. §734.08 (Cum.
Supp. 1947), so as to authorize the county judge to direct distribution anyhow, not
only upon "petition that the estate consists of no more than the homestead and exempt
personal property of the decedent," but even "in the event the allegations of said
petition are denied by trial of the issues made. .. ." The result seems fantastic; it is
submitted that this change in the meaning of the earlier provision was unintended,
even by the draftsman. The older language was considered in Seashole v. O'Shields,
139 Fla. 839, 191 So. 74 (1939), in'which the entire estate, which was homestead,
consisted of $626.71 of personalty; and the jurisdiction of the county judge's court
in administration was not even questioned.
".FLA. STAT., c. 735 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
"'FA. STAT. §735.04 (Cum. Supp. 1947); cf. §§735.05, 735.06.
10839 Fla. 239, 22 So. 651 (1897).
"'Fla. Laws 1881, c. 3246, now FLA. STAT. §§222.08-222.10 (1941).
"'Howard v. Calhoun, 155 Fla. 689, 21 So.2d 361 (1945).
"'FLA.

CoNsT. Art. V, §11.
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mean that our Legislature is powerless to assign wholly or partly to other
courts matters not lying exclusively within equity jurisdiction in the course
of the common law;372 and the roots of homestead are not that deep. In
other words, jurisdiction over homestead property is not frozen within
equity by the Constitution.
Viewed from another angle, it is readily apparent that, should homestead personalty be regarded as outside the estate, the probate judge
could never exercise any jurisdiction over it, regardless of the fact that in
many proceedings its homestead character stands undisputed. Yet we
have just seen that he does in practice deal with its administration; and
in doing so he necessarily passes on its homestead character as an unavoidable preliminary step.
Homestead personalty merits special consideration by the practitioner.
The probate judge, sitting as the county judge's court, is not looking for it
specifically, since what has come to be regarded as his constitutional
incapacity to deal with issues involving realty allegedly homestead tends
naturally to make him "homestead-unconscious" as regards personalty
also. The homesteader, if he be one, is of course dead; and his successors
are seldom aware of their legal rights. And personalty is notorious for its
ability to vanish with a speed that is the perpetual envy of realty. Accordingly, any claim of personalty exemption should be made promptly, lest
all the funds be dissipated in paying the debts of the homesteader and the
heirs be left with naught but a claim against an insolvent administrator
373
or executor.
When the contention that certain personalty is homestead is advanced
and no dispute ensues, the property is set aside by the probate judge as
exempt. In the event of a contest over the exemption, however, the position is not entirely free from doubt. To be absolutely safe, one should
go to the circuit court unless the estate qualifies as an exempt estate or a
small estate. 3 7 4 There are no valid constitutional objections to the
statutory vesting of jurisdiction over these latter in the county judge's
court, as far as personalty is concerned; but as regards larger estates a
statute declaring all homestead personalty to be a part thereof, and
authorizing the county judge to adjudicate initially all claims of personalty
exemption along with the more complicated non-homestead matters al.. 2 This proposition is ably substantiated by Buford, J., In re Niernsee's Estate, 147
Fla. 388, 2 So.2d 737 (1941).
...
McDougal v. Brokaw, 22 Fla. 98 (1886).
"'See notes 365, 366 supra.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol2/iss2/2
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ready encompassed in probate proceedings, is highly desirable. Meanwhile some doubt remains, although logically it should be resolved in
favor of probate jurisdiction.
Realty. Jurisdiction over homestead realty is even worse confounded
than that over personalty. Probably the most effective method of attacking the problem is to summarize at the outset the two major lines of argument, each of which commands considerable support.
On the one hand, the true line of demarcation between the jurisdiction
of the county judge's court and the circuit court over realty allegedly
homestead may be said to lie in the basic determination that it is homestead or non-homestead. A decision that it is homestead necessarily eliminates it from the estate, according to this view, while a contrary determination places it within the estate. There is no doubt today that when the
choice is that of deciding merely whether a given individual qualifies for
participation either as a devisee or as an intestate successor in apportionment of realty admittedly belonging to the estate, or when the task is one
of fixing the type and amount of his share, the county judge should make
the determination. But when the claim of homestead is involved, the
problem of title arises as an issue separate and distinct from that of disposition of the estate, so the argument goes; and the first step is to determine what belongs to the estate. This answer must be given by the
circuit court, inasmuch as title to realty is in issue and no probate jurisdiction can possibly arise unless and until such property is judicially decared a part of the estate. This view is substantiated by an emphatic
opinion,3 7 5 and it appears to be widely accepted by county judges. 3 7 6
On the other hand, it can cogently be argued that probate jurisdiction
of an estate includes by necessary implication the power to decide in the
first instance what belongs to it; to administer an estate without knowing
what it consists of is about as simple a task as picking up one side of a
coin. The statutory provisions relating to exempt estates and small
estates 3 7 7 embrace both realty and personalty, yet neither a proviso that
the estate must be found to consist of the homestead realty and exempt
personal property only, nor the mere fixing of a dollar limit on the estate
as a whole, renders realty any the less real. The jurisdictional conflict
"'Spitzer v. Branning, 135 Fla. 49, 184 So. 770 (1938), 139 Fla. 259, 190 So. 516

(1939).

"'TSee, e.g., Collins v. ColUins, 150 Fla. 374, 375, 7 So.2d 443 (1942).
"'See notes 365, 366 supra.
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remains unsolved: Which court is to decide whether an item of property
belongs to the estate?
We have seen in the discussion of personalty, immediately preceding,
that homestead personal property is not a part of equity jurisdiction in
the course of the common law and is therefore not necessarily the exclusive province of the circuit court under the Constitution. No such escape
presents itself, however, when the assignment of "exclusive original jurisdiction . . . of all actions involving the titles or boundaries of real

estate"3'' 7 8 is faced, unless the term "actions" can be strictly construed to
exclude every issue of title related to probate proceedings. From a practical standpoint, however, the result that such a decision would produce
is precisely what is needed, whether accomplished in this or a different
manner.
A start, at least, has been made toward this goal; and the trend of late
is to render unto the probate judge the things that are probate, even in
those instances in which title to realty is inescapably in issue. 3 7 9 To
date, however, the property in question has each time admittedly fallen
within the estate; and our jurisdictional nemesis still pursues us in the
form of real property alleged by some party in interest to lie outside.
At this point a trained logician might offer the pithy observation that
the existence or absence of dispute is immaterial; any dealing with property as a part of the estate, whether this property be "admittedly" such
or not, must of necessity rest on a determination by the judge dealing with
it that it belongs to the estate. By the same token, if he rejects it, such a
decision unavoidably rests on a determination that the property does not
belong to the estate. That such an election is based on the homestead
or non-homestead character of the property, as distinct from, say, the fact
that it did not belong to- the deceased in the first place, is irrelevant.
Logically, then, either the probate judge has jurisdiction to fix the contents of the estate or he has not. If he has, then he should make this
initial decision with regard to all property, homestead as well as nonhomestead; if he has not, then the circuit court should in every instance,
regardless of the existence of a contest, decide exactly what the estate
consists of, or, in other words, what the county judge may or may not
deal with in the probate proceedings.
The lines of battle now appear: either the statutes giving jurisdiction
to the county judge's court in instances of exempt estates and small
""FLA. CONST. Art. V, §11.
...
See note 350 supra.
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estates are unconstitutional in so far as they purport to include homestead realty, or the underlying theory of Spitzer v. Branning3 SO is fallacious. The constitutional validity of the former has not as yet felt a homestead broadside.3 8 1 On the other hand, an attempt might be made to
limit Spitzer v. Branning as a precedent on the ground that no specific
decision as to homestead was made by the probate judge; the homestead
character of the realty dealt with was overlooked at that stage by all concerned. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the property was handled
as a part of the estate; and this by necessary implication involved the
assumption that it was not homestead. This assumption was later seized
upon as a fatal mistake.
Going a step further, is there any sound basis for holding that homestead realty is outside the estate in a broad sense? Certainly it is property left by the deceased. It differs from his other property in three
respects only: he cannot devise it when he leaves a widow or lineal descendants; it passes pursuant to a statutory scheme different from, but
no more mandatory than, the order of succession prescribed for other
property in intestacy; and the interests of the widow, an heir, or both,
are paramount to the normally superior claims of those creditors whose
obligations are neither of the secured type nor relieved of the homestead
bar by Section 1 of Article X. Nowhere does the Constitution banish this
property from the estate; nor does title to realty in intestacy, whether the
intestacy be forced or voluntary, constitute any more serious a question of
title than does title to property left by will.882
280135 Fla. 49, 184 So. 770 (1938) ; 139 Fla. 259, 190 So. 516 (1939).

"'In Coral Gables First Nat. Bank v. Hart, 155 Fla. 482, 20 So.2d 647 (1945), the
Court rejected the contention that the statute is unconstitutional, as a violation of due
process, merely because it fails to prescribe notice to creditors prior to entry of an
order of "No Administration Necessary" upon ex parte petition. But the intestate
owned no realty and owed no debts; and the opinion specifically points out that no
homestead issues were involved. The initial adjudication had been made by the county
judge. In Coral Gables First Nat. Bank v. Colee, 155 Fla. 498, 20 So.2d 675 (1945),
the intestate was a childless married woman, evidently not the head of the family,
with the result that once again homestead was not considered. The constitutionality
of Fla. Laws 1935, c. 16992, now FLA. STA.., c. 735 (1941), authorizing adjudication of
the homestead character of realty by the county judge, was raised in Hillsborough
Inv. Co. v. Wilcox, 152 Fla. 889, 897, 13 So. 2d 448, 453 (1943) ; but, since the Supreme
Court was affirming a finding of homestead by the chancellor, the appellant was denied
any standing to challenge the probate jurisdiction of the county judge in the initial
proceedings. The constitutional issue was thus neatly sidestepped.
3"See note 350 supra. This reasoning finds strong support in Bengston v. Setterberg, 35 N.W. 2d 623 (Minn. 1949), ruling out jurisdictional attack in a Spitzer v.
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The most vulnerable spot in Spitzer v. Branning38 3 is found in its
impractical results; and accordingly the case merits detailed analysis. A
will was contested by the widow of the testator. From the opinions it is
evident that counsel for her, as well as the original counsel for the son,
should have known that a portion of the estate was homestead realty;
but for some reason the matter was overlooked. The county judge, not
being omniscient as to facts not brought to his attention, divided all the
property of the deceased in such a manner that the homestead realty
happened to be allotted entirely to his widow; and the opinions do not
indicate that any objection was made at the time. When she died some
years later, she devised this property. Thereafter the son finally awoke
and claimed his share of this portion of the estate, although the original
allotment to trustees under the testamentary trust of his father, of which
the son was a beneficiary, had unwittingly been enlarged by the assumption that there was no homestead realty.
Had a timely appeal been filed in the probate proceedings, the jurisdictional issue could readily have been avoided by a reversal based on
failure to apply the substantive law governing descent of homestead realty;
but after the lapse of several years a collateral attack predicated on lack
of jurisdiction was the only move left. The homestead land was reapportioned on the ground that the widow did not own, and accordingly could
not devise, property over which the probate judge had lacked jurisdiction
at the time he allocated it to her outright as part of her share. The matter of equitable readjustment was, in fairness, left open by the Supreme
Court for still further dispute.
Assuming that this readjustment was later effected, as indeed it should
have been, the net result was that after years of litigation, including two
pilgrimages to the Supreme Court, the parties were finally back where
they started, minus costs and counsel fees, and, in all probability, minus
increased expenses of the corporate trustee. There is one exception to
this statement: the unfortunate devisees of the widow were left without the
realty, and her intent was completely thwarted when she was no longer
on hand to rectify the matter.
This case marks another stirring performance of the Ballet of the
Jurisdictional Categories. The dance begins with a lively and sustained
duo by Estate and Probate; the latter slips, whereupon Homestead and
Procedure, disguised as Constitution, leap upon the stage; finally Equity,
Branning controversy.
83"135 Fla. 49, 184 So. 770 (1938) ; 139 Fla. 259, 190 So. 516 (1939).
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leading Corporate Trustee, scurries in to restore the symmetry. The dance
ends with Estate, by now nearly exhausted, moving wearily through the
opening steps again, this time in the arms of Equity. To some this may
appear as a legal spectacle of rare beauty, but one cannot easily put from
his mind the timely reference of Mehrtens to "the impatience of laymen
with the concept of law ir. action as a game. Since the laymen pay for
the game, such an objection comes from a valid source." 3 8 4
It is difficult to discover any cogent defensive arguments against placing all probate jurisdiction, including determination of the homestead
character of both realty and personalty, in the county judge's court. Although not required by law to be members of the bar, the vast majority
of the county judges are today attorneys. The "supervision and appellate
jurisdiction" of the circuit court in probate matters insures ready correction of any error. s 8 5 Expense would be less. And any judge deemed
competent to handle estates running into hundreds of thousands of dollars
can safely be trusted to make the initial decision as to the first thousand
of personalty and any alleged family residence in Florida. Furthermore,
since most of the factors required to establish the existence of the homestead realty exemption govern the personalty exemption as well, it is definitely desirable to assign the decision of both matters to the same court.
Obviously the probate court is the tribunal best suited to perform this
function in the first instance.
An amendment to the Constitution may not, strictly speaking, be
necessary to effectuate this, as the foregoing analysis demonstrates; but,
with the situation so doubtful, it is not surprising to find the issue definitely settled in the language proposed by the Committee on New Constitution of the Florida State Bar Association. 3 88 Should this proposal
meet with the customary delay, one hopes that in any event the Supreme
Court will, in future decisions involving this jurisdictional tangle, maintain the realistic attitude manifested of late in instances of title to realty
387
dependent upon the construction of a will.
"'Deposition and Discovery in Florida under the Federal Rules, 1 U. op FLA. L.
Rxv. 149, 200 (1948); cf. Fee, Justice in Search of a Handmaiden, 2 U. oF FLA. L.
Rxv. 175, 213, 217 (1949).
"'FFLA. CoNsT. Art. V, §11; cf., e.g., In re Lorenzo's Estate, 35 So.2d 587 (Fla.
1948); Miller v. Nelson, 35 So.2d 288 (Fla. 1948); In re Thompson's Estate, 145 Fla.
42, 199 So. 352 (1940); Rahming v. Mackey, 136 Fla. 713, 187 So. 579 (1939).
$8'23 FLA. L. ..91, 93 (1949).
'"See note 350 supra.
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2. Methods of Proceeding
Forced Sale -The
Debtor. The owner of realty may record in the
office of the county judge his claim that certain property is his homestead. 3 8 8 Undoubtedly such a declaration is of some value as an evidentiary fact leading to the desired conclusion or finding of fact that the
property so claimed is homestead. It is equally certain, however, that
failure to record a declaration of this type is not fatal to the characterization of the property as homestead,3 8 9 nor does recording conclusively
establish such characterization. 3 9 0 In this connection it is well to note
that a claim relating to the so-called homestead tax exemption, which is
actually nothing but a residence exclusion available even to a single person
living alone, is governed by separate rules, based on radically different
concepts; no reliance whatever can be placed thereon in establishing family headship and the existence of the exemption from forced sale or the
influence of such exemption on transfer of the property involved; 3 9 1 a
claim of tax exemption carries weight with regard to no more than the
3 92
problem of fixing the domicile or permanent residence of the claimant.
It is, nevertheless, advisable to record one's residence as a homestead.
Whenever the property claimed as homestead is possessed by another
and the claimant is entitled to possession, the obvious remedy is an action
of ejectment in the circuit court. 3 93 When brought by the heirs against
...
FLA. STAT.

§222.01

(1941).

".Hutchinson Shoe Co. v. Turner, 100 Fla. 1120, 130 So. 623 (1930); Baker v.
State, 17 Fla. 406 (1879); cf. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Magwood, 107 Fla. 208,
210, 145 So. 67, 68 (1932).

... Drucker v. Rosenstein, 19 Fla. 191 (1882) ; Oliver v. Snowden, 18 Fla. 823 (1882)
(both dealing with Fla. Laws 1869, c. 1715, §1, from which FLA. STAT. §222.01 (1941)
has come down with no change whatever as regards the matter here under consideration).
...
FLA. STAT. §§192.16, 167.72 (Cune. Supp. 1947); Shambow v. Shambow, 153 Fla.
760, 15 So.2d 836 (1943), in which the distinction is concisely put by Adams, J.;
Nelson v. Franklin, 152 Fla. 694, 12 So.2d 771 (1943) ; cf. Giddens v. McFarlan, 152
Fla. 281, 10 So.2d 807 (1943). The subject of tax exclusions is discussed in Part V
infra.
..Cf. Collins v. Collins, 150 Fla. 374, 7 So.2d 443 (1942), in which the claim of
tax exemption for three successive years immediately preceding the death of the
alleged homesteader was given weight in reaching a conclusion that the realty claimed
to be homestead for descent purposes was in fact his residence.
".'E.g.,Gulf Refining Co. v. Ankeny, 102 Fla. 151, 135 So. 521 (1931) ; Raulerson
v. Peeples, 77 Fla. 207, 81 So. 271 (1919) ; Barclay v. Robertson, 67 Fla. 416, 65 So.
546 (1914).
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executors or administrators, however, and one of the heirs is a minor, a
bill in equity is the proper procedural medium for setting apart a homestead out of a larger tract. 3 9 4 In other instances a homesteader may
wish to file to bill to quiet title, 39 5 or to enjoin the sale of realty claimed
to be exempt, 3 9 6 or to cancel deeds allegedly invalid, 3 97 or to obtain
relief in a general way.3 98
Turning to personalty, an action of replevin to recover possession is
available. 3 9 9 Alternatively, the remedies created by statute may be pursued. 40 0 Or a claim of equitable lien may be advanced. 4 0 ' Furthermore, a debtor need not await immediate threat of forced sale before tak40 2
ing steps to establish homestead exemption.
Forced Sale -The
Creditor. Perhaps the most important step for a
creditor is to obtain a specific mortgage, since a blanket waiver is ineffectual. 40 3 Judgment liens should be recorded in each county in which
3

'Contrast Barco v. Fennell, 24 Fla. 378, 5 So. 9 (1888), with Shone v. Bellmore,

75 Fla. 515, 78 So. 60 (1918); cf.

CRANiAL,

FLORIDA Conmox LAW PRACTICE 394

(1928). Ejectment does lie, however, even by minors, when the boundaries of the
homestead are not in dispute, Raulerson v. Peeples, supra note 393. The distinction
between ejectment and equity in boundary disputes is carefully analyzed in KooArmw,
FLORmA CHAmucEY PLEADING AND PRACTIC 14 (1939). For an excellent discussion of
the use of ejectment see also the opinion of Whitfield, J., in Walters v. Sheffield, 75 Fla.
505, 78 So. 539 (1918).
... E.g., Smith v. St. Petersburg Novelty Works, 94 Fla. 540, 113 So. 769 (1927);
Hutchinson Shoe Co. v. Turner, 100 Fla. 1120, 130 So. 623 (1930). On the subject of
quieting title pursuant to statute see Legis., 1 U. or, FLA. L. REv. 395 (1948); 2 U. or
FLA.
L. REv. 156 (1949).
80
" E.g., Coleman v. Williams, 146 Fla. 45, 200 So. 207 (1941); Morehead v. Yongue,
134 Fla. 135, 183 So. 804 (1938).
"'E.g., Florida Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. Winn, 158 Fla. 750, 30 So.2d 298 (1947);
Jahn v. Purvis, 145 Fla. 354, 199 So. 340 (1940).
:"8LaMar v. Lechlider, 135 Fla. 703, 185 So. 833 (1939).
"'Howard v. Calhoun, 155 Fla. 689, 21 So.2d 361 (1945); Allen v. Ingram, 39 Fla.
239, 22 So. 651 (1897).
"'°FLA. STAT., c. 222 (1941). Certain of these remedies apply to both realty and
personalty, e.g., Giddens v. McFarlan, 152 Fla. 281, 10 So.2d 807 (1943) (realty);
Bennett v. Bogue, 88 Fla. 109, 101 So. 206 (1924) (personalty).
-"'E.g.,Sonneman v. Tuszynski, 139 Fla. 824, 191 So. 18 (1939); Jones v. Carpenter,
90 Fla. 407, 106 So. 127 (1925).
'"Smith v. St. Petersburg Novelty Works, 94 Fla. 540, 113 So. 769 (1927) (realty);
West Florida Grocery Co. v. Teutonia Fire Ins. Co., 74 Fla. 220, 228, 77 So. 209, 212
(1917) (personalty, at least as there construed).
"'Contrast In re Comstock's Estate, 143 Fla. 500, 197 So. 121 (1940), with Heddon

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1949

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [1949], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
the judgment debtor has property, and it is vital that this be done before
such property becomes homestead. 40 4 Remedies to enforce statutory
liens or obligations excepted from the bar of homestead exemption should
not be overlooked. 40 5 The statutory remedies authorizing survey and
sale, or a bill to test alleged exemptions, are most effective; 406 and concealment by the debtor of his assets can be brought to light and recti40 7
fied.
Probate. The claim of homestead exemption in pr6bate proceedings
should be raised promptly, and if denied should be placed in issue at once.
The analysis of jurisdiction 40 8 is applicable here. While the court will
do its utmost to protect homestead exemptions, the judge cannot be expected to divine factual situations overlooked by counsel and carelessly
omitted in the pleadings and the record. 40 9 The statutory provisions
relating to exempt estates and small estates have already been mentioned. 41 0 A declaratory decree may be sought. 4 1 A suit for partition is
41 2
frequently used.

v. Jones, 115 Fla. 19, 154 So. 891 (1934) (realty) ; contrast Richardson v. Myers, 106
Fla. 136, 143 So. 157 (1932), with Lowe v. Keith, 138 Fla. 654, 190 So. 67 (1939),
and Carter's Adm'rs v. Carter, 20 Fla. 558 (1834) (personalty).
"e'See Part I, 5 supra, 2 U. or FLA. L. REv. 35-36 (1949); cf. Heddon v. Jones,
supra note 403.
...
See in general FLA. CONST. Art. X, §1; FLA. STAT., C. 85 (1941); Howard v. Calhoun, 155 Fla. 689, 21 So.2d 361 (1945) (claim of landlord for rent); Cathcart v.
Turner, 18 Fla. 837 (1882) (agricultural products of tenant not exempt); contrast
Hodges v. Cooksey, 33 Fla. 715, 15 So. 549 (1894). How far the Supreme Court will
go in whittling away the exemptions guaranteed by our Constitution is impossible to
predict at this time; cf. the discussion supra in 2 U. oF FLA. L. REV. 79-80 (1949).
08
' FLA. STAr. §§222.03, 222.04, 222.06, 222.10 (1941).
.'.Florida Loan & Trust Co. v. Crabb, 45 Fla. 306, 33 So. 523 (1903); cf. Shollar
Crate and Box Co. v. Passmore, 148 Fla. 466, 4 So.2d 530 (1941).
".See Part IV, 1 supra.
"'.Compare, e.g., Hedick v. Hedick, 38 Fla. 252, 21 So. 101 (1896), with Spitzer v.
Branning, 135 Fla. 49, 184 So. 770 (1938).
'.See notes 365, 366, 381 supra.
.'.Adams v. Adams, 158 Fla. 173, 28 So.2d 254 (1946). Declaratory decrees are
today provided by FLA. STAT., C. 87 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
... E.g., Nelson v. Franklin, 152 Fla. 694, 12 So.2d 771 (1943) ; Parrish v. Robbirds,
146 Fla. 324, 200 So. 925 (1941) ; McEwen v. Larson, 136 Fla. 1, 185 So. 866 (1939);
Bess v. Anderson, 102 Fla. 1127, 136 So. 898 (1931).
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PracticalStrength of Decree of Chancdlor. Success before the chancellor is of the utmost importance. Normally his findings stand, 413 even
though the Supreme Court may entertain some doubt. 41 4

Reversals can

always be based on errors of law, of course, the outstanding example being
the five appeals in Oates v. New York Life Ins. Co.,415 a brilliant exhibition of judicial badminton by two fast Supreme Court teams, with the
hapless chancellor playing the difficult position of the bird. Since, however, conflicting evidence will be re-weighed only to the extent necessary
to determine whether the findings of fact are clearly erroneous or without
substantial evidentiary support, reversals are properly confined to errors
of law and to findings of fact upon which the decision below necessarily
rests and yet which could not have been reached on the basis of the evi41 6
dence in the record.
3. Waiver, Estoppel and Laches
It may be stated as a general principle that the courts are reluctant to
impair the assertion of a claim of homestead exemption. It may be fur-

...E.g., United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Marshall, 148 Fla. 286, 292, 4
So.2d 337, 339 (1941); Weber v. Harvey, 127 Fla. 706, 174 So. 5 (1937); Harkins v.
Holt, 124 Fla. 774, 778, 169 So. 481, 482 (1936); Lanier v. Lanier, 95 Fla. 522, 116 So.
867 (1928). This is true even on review of a decree based on testimony taken before an
examiner or master, Shad v. Smith, 74 Fla. 324, 76 So. 897 (1917). As regards the
findings of the master, the rule was recently pronounced by Hobson, J., in Miami v.
Huttoe, 38 So.2d 819, 820 (Fla. 1949), "that a Chancellor should give great weight to
the findings and recommendations of a Master and follow them unless such findings
and recommendations are manifestly against the clear preponderance of the evidence."
Cf. Thomas, J., in Cohien v. Fincke, 39 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1949) passim.
"'E.g., Smith v. Guckenheimer & Sons, 42 Fla. 1, 19, 27 So. 900, 916 (1900).
...
113 Fla. 678, 152 So. 671 (1934) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Oates, 122 Fla. 540,
166 So. 269 (1935), rev'd on rehearing, 122 Fla. 565, 166 So. 279 (1936) ; Oates v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 130 Fla. 851, 178 So. 570 (1937) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Oates,
141 Fla. 164, 192 So. 637 (1939); Oates v. New York Life Ins. Co., 144 Fla. 744, 198
So. 681 (1940); cf. Smith v. McEwen, 119 Fla. 588, 592, 161 So. 68, 70 (1935).
"'E.g., Weber v. Harvey, 127 Fla. 706, 174 So. 5 (1937); Helland v. Evans, 113 Fla.
839, 152 So. 623 (1934) ; contrast the opposite aspect of this rule, as applied in Saliba
v. Saliba, 37 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1948). The meaning of "substantial evidence" is discussed

in Note, 2 U. or

FLA.

L. REv. 86, 93 (1949), as related to review of administrative

orders. Whether there is a conceptual distinction in chancery appeals between "lack
of substantial evidence" and "clear error in findings" is beyond the scope of our discussion here.
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ther laid down as a general proposition that with the exception of the tax
exclusions, dealt with in Part V infra, true waiver is a stranger to the law
of homestead. In a loose sense either a specific mortgage or the creation
of a legal relationship involving statutory liens by operation of law might
be regarded as a waiver; and there is also the individual that deliberately
chooses to pay his debts, in which event any transfer of homestead realty
must be performed strictly in accordance with the formal legal requisites. 41 7 The fact remains, however, that few losses of homestead
rights are occasioned by estoppel or laches.
The principles governing estoppel are analyzed with customary thoroughness by Mr. Justice Whitfield in the fourth Oates appeal. 41 8 In particular, the party alleging the estoppel must have changed his position to
his own detriment in reliance upon the act or omission of the other par4 20
ty. 41 9 Equitable estoppel, which constitutes the basis of equitable liens,
has been invoked on occasion, particularly in instances in which a widow
makes a void conveyance of the homestead; in such event the conveyance
is upheld as to her interest, inasmuch as she should not be permitted to
profit by her illegal act.4 2 1 Estoppel has not infrequently been employed
to bar denial by the wife of proper acknowledgment after she has executed
42 2
and purported to acknowledge a document.
...
See Part II, 2 supra, 2 U. or FLA. L. REv. 62 (1949). Conveyance of homestead
realty by the wife, without a joinder by a guardian authorized by a court of equity to
act for the insane husband, has been declared insufficient to pass valid title, even
though the wife be his guardian for other purposes. Stokes v. Whidden, 97 Fla. 1057,
122 So. 566 (1929). The recent Florida Guardianship Law does not apply to conveyance of homesteads, FLA. STAT. §745.15(5) (Cum. Supp. 1947).
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Oates, 141 Fla. 164, 175, 192 So. 637, 642 (1939).
... Spitzer Iv. Branning, 135 Fla. 49, 184 So. 770 (1938), 139 Fla. 259, 190 So. 516
(1939).
... Jones v. Carpenter, 90 Fla. 407, 414, 106 So. 127, 129 (1925). This opinion, by

Terrell, J., contains a very helpful analysis of equitable liens and their basis in the
doctrine of estoppel.
... Shone v. Bellmore, 75 Fla. 515, 526, 78 So. 605, 608 (1918) ; cf. Kerivan v. Fogal,
156 Fla. 92, 22 So.2d 584 (1945); Jahn v. Purvis, 145 Fla. 354, 359, 199 So. 340, 343
(1940); Church v. Lee, 102 Fla. 478, 490, 136 So. 242, 248 (1931); Mullan v. Bank of
Pasco County, 101 Fla. 1097, 1114, 133 So. 323, 330 (1931).

' The cases indicate an epidemic of notarial incompetence.

Contrast, e.g., Oates

v. New York Life Ins. Co., 144 Fla. 744, 198 So. 681 (1940), and Bank of Jennings v.
Jennings, 71 Fla. 145, 71 So. 31 (1916), with Helland v. Evans, i13 Fla. 839, 152 So.
623 (1934), Hutchinson v. Stone, 79 Fla. 157, 84 So. 151 (1920), and Shad v. Smith, 74

Fla. 324, 76 So. 897 (1917) ; cf. the discussion of presumptions in Part IV, 5 infra.
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The doctrine of laches, namely, that failure to exercise reasonable
diligence in asserting one's rights results in their loss, is applied sparingly
against claimants of homestead exemption, although in extreme cases it
has been utilized with telling effect. 4 2 3 Mere failure to resist forced
sale, however, is not in and of itself sufficient to establish a waiver of
the right to exemption; 42 4 nor does the claimant lose his rights by neglecting to assert them at the first opportunity provided he moves before
expiration of the time allowed him by law, even though the practical
effect of his delay may prove unfortunate for others proceeding in good
faith though rather carelessly.4 25 Remaindermen are not barred by
laches merely because they permit their widowed mother to remain on
the homestead property, ostensibly in their eyes as a life tenant rather than
.as owner in fee simple, unless they in fact have notice that her possession is
not what it purports to be and yet stand idly by while a third party is misled. 4 2 6 Again, both parties may have been asleep, in which event laches
427
will notbe attributed to either.
4. Need for a Homestead Limitations and Filing Act
Although the doctrines of estoppel and laches have been applied at
various times, the mind of a property lawyer is not content to rest upon
mere equity when passing definitely on the soundness of a title. The result is.that the possibility of homestead claims is left dehors the record; a
proper title opinion is virtually impossible in cases of real property that
may be subject to the law of homestead. The Supreme Court has frankly
admitted that the public records as presently kept furnish no dependable
clues as to either the use of the property or family headship, and that
conditions may well change from time to time without any reflection in the

"'2Jones v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 126 Fla. 527, 171 So. 317 (1936); Moseley v.
Taylor, 68 Fla. 294, 67 So. 95 (1914) ; Barclay v. Robertson, 67 Fla. 416, 65 So. 546
(1914).
"'Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Magwood, 107 Fla. 208, 145 So. 67 (1932); Hutchinson

Shoe Co. v. Turner, 100 Fla. 1120, 130 So. 623 (1930); Albritton v. Scott, 73 Fla. 856,
74 So. 975 (1917) ; McMichael v. Grady, 34 Fla. 219, 228, 15 So. 765, 768 (1894).
'"Giddens v. McFarlan, 152 Fla. 281, 10 So.2d 807 (1943); Jahn v. Purvis, 145 Fla.
354, 357, 199 So. 340, 342 (1940).

"'ContrastMullan v. Bank of Pasco County, 101 Fla. 1097, 133 So. 323 (1931), with
Commercial Bldg. Co. v. Parslow, 93 Fla. 143, 112 So. 378 (1927).
"'Spitzer v. Branning, 135 Fla. 49, 184 So. 770 (1938).
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records. 42 8 As a result, the unfortunate purchaser can only hope that
the homestead demon will not suddenly arise out of the legal bog and
gobble up his property.
This unhealthy condition could readily be altered. To be completely
safe a constitutional amendment would be best; but the Legislature has
full powers under Section 6 of Article X to "enact such laws as may be
necessary to enforce" the homestead provisions, and a filing act would
in all probability ride out any constitutional storm, provided it prescribed
a reasonable period, subsequent to its enactment, within which claims of
42 9
homestead existing at the time of enactment should be filed.

The mere filing, or recording if preferred, could not of itself conclusively establish homestead, of course, but neglect in filing a claim could
be rendered a waiver by the homesteader of exemption from forced sale.
Similarly, failure on the part of interested successors to claim any of the
estate as homestead within a fixed period after the death of the owner
could be made a waiver of all such contentions on their part. To be sure,
some few individuals might inadvertently lose rights they would otherwise
have; but no copious tears have been shed over the loss of the homestead
tax exclusions occurring whenever the required annual claim therefor is
not filed on or before the first of April. The presumption that each person governed knows the law springs in desperation from communal necessity rather than from fact; indeed, everyone knows that this presumption
is the opposite of the truth. Yet it has long endured, in spite of the
hardships it has occasioned at times. 43 0

...
See Bigelow v. Dunphe, 143 Fla. 603, 606-607, 197 So. 328, 330 (1940). Recorded
encumbrances can be checked, however, and prudent counsel will make a search; cf.

Giddens v. McFarlan, 152 Fla. 281, 10 So.2d 807 (1943).
... Detailed discussion of this matter is outside the scope of this article; see generally
FLA. CONST. Art. III, §33; Mahood v. Bessemer Properties, Inc., 154 Fla. 710, 18 So.2d
775 (1944); Campbell v. Home, 147 Fla. 523, 3 So.2d 125 (1941); Lee v. Lang, 140
Fla. 782, 192 So. 490 (1939); Rogers, Florida Curative Statutes, 22 FA. L. J. 153
(1948).

"'The maxim ignorantia iuris haud excusat has been accepted for centuries; cf.
DIGEST 22.6.9.pr.: Regula est, iuris quidem ignorantiam cuique nocere, facti vero
ignorantiam non nocere; Cooper v. Phibbs, L. R. 2 H. L. 149, 170 (1867) (per Lord

Westbury); M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 723 (1843)
(per Tindal, L. C. J.) ; Stewart v. Stewart, 6 Cl. & Fin. 911, 965-971, 7 Eng. Rep. 940,
962-964 (1839) (per Cottenhan, L. C.); Barlow v. United States, 7 Pet. 404, 411
(U. S. 1833) (per Story, J.).
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5. Burdens and Presumptions
Burdens. Burden of proof in homestead law is largely a matter of
common sense. The basic principle is that he who alleges something
affirmatively must establish it.4 3 3 That a creditor must establish the
debt, as well as the existence and date of his lien, if any, is elementary.
Thereupon, if the homestead exemption be advanced in order to avoid
levy, the claimant must plead and prove that he is entitled to the exemption. 4 3 2 He should allege that the realty is the family home, 4 33 or that
the personalty claimed as exempt does not exceed $1,000; 4 3 4 that the
owner is the head of a family, 4 3 5 and also a resident of Florida; 4 3 6
that the land lies in one tract or contiguous tracts; 4 3 7 that it is rural and
does not exceed 160 acres, or that it is urban and does not exceed onehalf acre; 43 8 that these factors existed at the time the lien attached; 43 9
and that the obligation is not one specifically excepted from the protection of homestead exemption. 4 4 0

"'The general theory of burden of proof, including the different meanings of the
term, and the debated distinction between burden of proof and burden of going forward, are beyond the scope of this article. A thorough analysis is contained in 9
WxomoRE, EvmErcE §§2485-2489 (burdens of proof), 2490-2493 (presumptions) (3d

ed. 1940).
"'Matthews v. Jeacle, 61 Fla. 686, 55 So. 865 (1911); cf.

TaRaBLE, TRAn MANUAL oP

FLORmA Evidence §2387 (1948).
'Ibid.
"'E.g., Sneed v. Davis, 135 Fla. 271, 184 So. 865 (1938).
'E.g., Herrin v. Brown, 44 Fla. 782, 33 So. 522 (1902); Bigelow v. Dunphe, 143
Fla. 603, 197 So. 328 (1940), afd on rehearing, 144 Fla. 330, 198 So. 13 (1940). In
spite of the occasional appearance of rather loose language, it is evident from the decision in the latter case that in the eye of the law there is no presumption that the husband is the family head; headship must be proved, whether the claimant thereto be
male or female. But the corollary follows that a third party cannot safely assume that
the husband is the family head, even though this is normally the fact in Florida.
" E.g., Post v. Bird, 28 Fla. 1, 24, 9 So. 888, 894 (1891).
" E.g., Brandies v. Perry, 39 Fla. 172, 22 So. 268 (1897).
"'F.A . CoNsT. Art. X, §1; cf., e.g., Barco v. Fennell, 24 Fla. 378, 5 So. 9 (1888)
(rural); McEwen v. Larson, 136 Fla. 1, 185 So. 866 (1939) (urban).
"'E.g., Bishop v. First Old State Bank, 142 Fla. 190, 194 So. 488 (1940); Dania
Bank v. Wilson & Toomer Fertilizer Co., 127 Fla. 45, 172 So. 476 (1937); First Nat.
Bank of Chipley v. Peel, 107 Fla. 413, 145 So. 177 (1932); Pasco v. Harley, 73 Fla.
819, 75 So. 30 (1917); Milton v. Milton, 63 Fla. 533, 58 So. 718 (1912).
" E.g., Smith v. St. Petersburg Novelty Works, 94 Fla. 540, 113 So. 769 (1927).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1949

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [1949], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
The creditor may then go forward and negative any one of these
factors, as, for example, by offering evidence to prove that the homestead
had been abandoned at the time the lien attached, 4 41 or that the family
had dispersed, 4 42 or that the owner of the property was not in fact the
head of the family at the material time, 4 4 3 or that the obligation lies

within the excepted categories. 44 4 Alternatively, he may affirmatively
allege that urban property claimed as exempt includes more than the residence and business house, 44 5 or that the debtor has concealed some
assets, 4 4 6 in which event the burden of proof, as distinct from the mere
burden of going forward, is on him. 4 4 7 A mere demurrer to allegations
of homestead, whether these be in a bill 4 8 or an answer, 4 4 9 is of no
avail, assuming of course that the homestead claim is properly pleaded.
Presumptions. Homestead law has gradually built up some presumptions of its own. An important principle, while not a presumption in the
true sense of the word, is pertinent at this point: doctrines of equity, however cogent from the standpoint of fair dealing, are not permitted to override Article X of the Florida Constitution. 4 50 The creditor, including a
mortgagee, is presumed to have ascertained the use of the mortgaged

... E.g., Murphy v. Farquhar, 39 Fla. 350, 22 So. 681 (1897); ci. Part I, 5 supra,
2 U. or FLA. L. Rav. 37, 40 (1949).

... Herrin v. Brown, 44 Fla. 782, 33 So. 522 (1902) (father left alone); accord,
Matthews v. Jeacle, 61 Fla. 686, 55 So. 865 (1911) (mother left alone); Jordan v.
Jordan, 100 Fla. 1586, 132 So. 466 (1931) (both left alone upon their separation after
departure of adult children) ; cf. Part I, 2 supra, 2 U. or FLA. L. Rv. 28 (1949).
"'E.g., Jones v. Federal Farm Mtg. Corp., 138 Fla. 65, 188 So. 804 (1939); cf. Part
I, 5 supra, 2 U. oF FLA. L. Ray. 35 (1949).
.'Cf. Part I, 1 supra, 2 U. oF FiA. L. Rav. 18 (1949).

"'Contrast McEwen v. Larson, 136 Fla. 1, 185 So. 866 (1939), with Cowdery v.
Herring, 106 Fla. 567, 143 So. 433 (1932); cf. Part I, 5 supra, 2 U. or FLA. L. REv.

40 (1949).
"Cf. 2 U. or FLA. L. REv. 81-82 (1949).
""E.g., Cowdery v. Herring, 106 Fla. 574, 144 So. 348 (1932) on rehearing (burden
of proving more than residence and business house held not carried, although this
holding was obviously conjured up as a handy procedural way out of an embarrassing
contradiction in the substantive law), Shollar Crate and Box Co. v. Passmore, 148
Fla. 466, 4 So.2d 530 (1941) (burden of establishing fraud not met).
".E.g., Johns v. Bowden, 68 Fla. 32, 46, 66 So. 155, 159 (1914). Demurrer is today
effected in equity by motion.
"'E.g., Rigby v. Middlebrooks, 102 Fla. 148, 135 So. 563 (1931).
"'McEwen v. Larson, 136 Fla. 1, 9, 185 So. 866, 869 (1939); cf. Bigelow v. Dunphe,
143 Fla. 603, 606, 197 So. 328, 330 (1940). But cf. Olsen v. Simpson, 39 So.2d 801,
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premises and the existence and hierarchical structure of any apparent family residing thereon. 4 5 ' The problem of selecting the family head among
elderly parents and healthy adult children residing together has been discussed at some length in Part I, 2 supra.4 5 2 While there may be a slight
leaning toward the oldest among either males or females as being the
family head, the authorities in their present state do not lend themselves
to safe indulgence in presumptions in these situations.
Transfer of property, whether homestead or not, by an insolvent husband to his wife raises two presumptions. The first is that the conveyance is voluntary; the second is that it is made in fraud of creditors.
When, however, the husband is solvent at the time of transfer, the first
presumption vanishes, and the voluntary nature of the conveyance must
be established by the complaining creditor before the second presumption
can operate. Once such evidence is introduced, the burden of going forward shifts to the defendant, who must negative the voluntary character
of the transfer by offering clear and convincing evidence of consideration. 4 5 3 The customary recital in the deed, referring to some nominal
amount of cash and other good and valuable consideration, is taken when
standing alone to indicate mere voluntary transfer; in other words, this
feeble effort to show consideration, in conveyances between husband and
wife, has the practical effect of establishing just the opposite. 45 4
Whenever the realty is homestead, any transfer by husband and wife
to the wife, either directly or via a third party, is assumed to be voluntary, probably because of the judicial transformation of the homestead
realty exemption into a rule of descent. 4 5 5 The heirs are treated as if
they were creditors during insolvency; and such a transfer is presumed
to be both voluntary and fraudulent as to them unless consideration is
803 (Fla. 1949) ; these dicta may perhaps mark the birth of a contrary trend.
"'Ibid.; cf. Jones v. Federal Farm Mtg. Corp., 138 Fla. 65, 188 So. 804 (1939).
"'12 U. or FLA L. REv. 26-27 (1949).
"'The law is expounded with exceptional clarity in Weathersbee v. Dekle, 107 Fia.
517, 145 So. 198 (1933), in which the Court set aside a mere voluntary conveyance of
non-homestead realty by a debtor solvent at the time, but upheld a transfer of nonhomestead personalty because not proven to have been voluntary; accord, Harkins v.
Holt, 124 Na. 774, 169 So. 481 (1936); Baker & Holmes Co. v. Gibson, 102 Fla. 891,
136 So. 544 (1931); Claflin v. Ambrose, 37 Na. 78, 19 So. 628 (1896).
"'Weathersbee v. Dekle, supra note 453; McKeown v. Allen, 37 Fla. 490, 20 So. 556
(1896) (alternative holding). The diminishing significance of a seal is discussed in
Note, 1 U. or FYA. L. Rav. 385 (1948).
'fC. Part IT, 3, supra, 2 U. or FRA. L. Rnv. 67 (1949).
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affirmatively established by the party relying thereon. 4 56
Notarization of acknowledgment, in correct form, raises a presumption of due and valid acknowledgment; the burden of going forward
thereupon shifts to the party attacking to establish that the certificate
is false, 4 5 7 and the chancellor must weigh the evidence if offered. 4 58
Mere platting of land does not raise a presumption that it has been
abandoned as a homestead, 45 9 even when accompanied by sale of certain of the lots, 4 60 although physical surrender to another is normally

46
decisive of the issue of abandonment. '
Finally, as might be expected, there is- the ironical yet familiar pre462
sumption that we all know the law of homesteads.

" 6A deed of homestead lands by parents to some of the children has been held valid,
even though it reserved a life estate in the grantors, but valuable consideration was
demonstrated by the evidence, Daniels v. Mercer, 105 Fla. 362, 141 So. 189 (1932).
Again, conveyance by husband to wife after abandonment of the tract as homestead
has been sustained against a creditor upon evidence of valuable consideration, Pettit
v. Coachman, 51 Fla. 521, 41 So. 401 (1906). But the rule is as stated in the text, not
only in instances of recital of consideration, without more, Mullan v. Bank of Pasco
County, 101 Fla. 1097, 133 So. 323 (1931), but even in the absence of any allegation
by the heirs of voluntary transfer, Church v. Lee, 102 Fla. 478, 485-488, 136 So. 242,
246-247 (1931).
.5 See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Oates, 141 Fla. 164, 178, 192 So. 637, 643 (1939).
... McEwen v. Schenck, 108 Fla. 119, 146 So. 839 (1933); cf. note 422 supra. The
use of the word "conclusive" in referring to this presumption in Herald v. Hardin, 95
Fla. 889, 892, 116 So. 863, 864 (1928), is a trifle too broad, although the statement
can be reconciled with the rule by regarding notarial incompetence as tantamount to
fraud. The fact remains, however, that female notaries were allowed to impeach their
own certificates in Helland v. Evans, 113 Fla. 839, 842, 152 So. 623, 624 (1934), and
Hutchinson v. Stone, 79 Fla. 157, 171, 84 So. 151, 155 (1920). The logical basis of the
distinction drawn in this latter case between presence before the notary and the other
requisites of proper acknowledgment is indeed difficult to fathom; presence without
acknowledgment is equally as ineffective as is acknowledgment without presence. In
neither event is the notary authorized to certify.
...
Hll v. First Nat. Bank of Marianna, 73 Fla. 1092, 75 So. 614 (1917).
.6 Shone v. Bellmore, 75 Fla. 515, 78 So. 605 (1918).
"6 Anderson Mill and Lumber Co. v. Clements, 101 Fla. 523, 134 So. 588 (1931).
Both physical and functional abandonment are discussed in Part I, 5 supra, 2 U. oF
FLA. L. REv. 37, 40 (1949).
2
' .E.g.,
Efstathion v. Saucer, 158 Fla. 422, 430, 29 So.2d 304, 308 (1947) (invalid
devise of homestead realty) ; In re Comstock's Estate, 143 Fla. 500, 197 So. 121 (1940)
(mortgage) ; cf. note 430 supra.
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